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Abstract 
 
The emergence of peer-to-peer file sharing technology revolutionises the discourse around 
copyright infringement. This new pirate of digital technology poses challenges not only to 
legal structures but it redefines tensions among various stakeholders: artists and creators 
genuine users of copyrighted works, content industries and technologists. They threaten 
cultural production turning users to consumers without effort to become producers. 
Conversely, it is contended that such software increase collaborative interactions and change 
the way we perceive social and communicative structures. A caveat is that the response of 
law when juxtapose with technological changes in the internet itself, has heavily increased 
the effective regulation of creativity. This paper examines the early debate around the 
regulation of p2p software. Can there be a middle ground?  
 
Keywords: Copyright, dual-use technology, authorisation, secondary infringement, peer-to-
peer  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Online sharing of music, sound recordings and videos have been caught between the battle 
for ownership and public right of usage. Technologies like peer-to-peer (P2P) which facilitate 
their communication and distribution have fallen under serious attack for being tools of 
commercial and non-commercial infringements yet they are capable of non-infringing 
purposes.  The impact of P2P on music sales continue to be subject to constant debate. Forty 
billion files of copyrighted digital materials were alleged to have been shared illegally in 
2008.1  Such allegations have been contested as assertions not based on statistically reliable 
information.2 This paper re-examines the conundrum of online copyright infringement and 
P2P technology relationship.  From Australian, American and Canadian perspectives, it 
investigates how courts try balance conflicting rights of technology developers and copyright 
owners. Does a constructive knowledge of infringing activities make an internet service 
providers or software manufacturer liable?  How do court strike a balance between the right 
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1 IFPI, Digital Music Report 2009 available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2009.pdf accessed on 20 
March 2014  
2 Marshall L, “Infringers” in Frith S and Marshall L (eds) Music and Copyright (Edinburgh University Press, 2nd 
ed 2004 p 194 
of copyright holders interests and the needs of the society in encouraging technological 
innovation where software or material provided are capable of commercially non-infringing 
uses like time-shifting? 
 
 
2. DUAL USE TECHNOLOGIES 
P2P software technologies are not the first generation of dual-use technologies. Printing 
machines are the first known of dual use technologies which helped massive production of 
books, and other reading materials. These machines were good until they were used to print 
seditious materials or copyrighted materials without permission.  More recent examples of 
dual use technologies are nuclear reactors that could generate plutonium for nuclear weapons 
and could also be used in generation of electricity and life saving pharmaceuticals.  
 
Dual use technologies like VCR, internet, computer and p2p file sharing software have 
transformed the way we access and distribute materials. They allow a more democratic mode 
of publishing, free from state censorship and publisher monopolies. To copyright owners, 
these technologies are a destructive force to creativity.3 Such criticism glosses over the 
contribution of these technologies in enhancing the popularity of creators through legal mass 
production and distribution of authors’ works.  
 
2.1. The nature of peer to peer technology 
Though the popularity of term peer-to-peer could be attributed to Napster, the concept and 
technology which influenced P2P could be traced to older technologies like IP routers, 
Usenet news server system, FidoNet  and others. These technologies moved towards 
distributed systems rather than monolithic systems 
 
Winer describes P2P as “a class of applications that take advantage of the resources – storage, 
cycles, content, human presence available at the edges of the internet.”4  A P2P as a network 
utilises the computing power and the bandwidth of the users in the network, each generally 
regarded as a peer. Each peer acts as a servent that is the nodes act at the same time as a client 
and as a server unlike a client-server networking, where the server has the responsibility for 
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4 David Winer ‘Clay Shirky on P2P’ available at 
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providing or serving network information and the client consumes or otherwise act as clients 
of those servers.5  P2P networks do not have problems of scalability and redundancy. As 
participants on the network increase, the resource of the system also increases more so that 
every participant is both a provider as well as requestor.  
 
P2P networks could be divided into two, namely those with a central entity and those without 
any central entities. A pure P2P network has no central server managing the network. Any 
single and arbitrary chosen peer can be removed without any disruption of the network 
service. Hybrid P2P networks on the other hand need a central server which maintains 
information on peers and responds to requests for such information. Some P2P networks use 
stronger peers called ‘super-peers’ or super-nodes’ as servers; client peers are then connected 
to a single super-peer. Super-peers are decentralized networks because no specific machines 
serve as index servers.  Instead the software running on all the peers takes stock of each 
other’s available resources, including bandwidth, drive space, and processing power.  
 
 
3.0 UNITED STATES COURTS AND DUAL USE TECHNOLOGIES  
 
3.1 The Pre-Napster Approach 
 
Under US copyright law, providers of technologies used for infringement could be held liable 
under the doctrine of secondary infringement (contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability).  In respect of contributory infringement, “one who with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the  infringing conduct of 
another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer.”6  On the other hand, a manufacturer 
may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and 
also has a direct financial interest in such activities.7  
 
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc8 the court sought to answer the question whether 
manufacturers of dual use technologies such as printing machines, photocopy machines and 
VCRs should be held liable for copyright infringements committed by users of their 
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architectures and applications. Proc. of 1st Intern. Conf. on Peer-to-Peer Computing, Linkoping, Sweden, pp. 
101–102, 
6 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v Columbia Artists Management Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir 1971). 
7 ibid 
8 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
technologies.  The plaintiffs alleged that Sony had contributed to infringement of its 
copyright by manufacturing and selling video cassette recorders (VCRs) which were being 
used by Sony’s customers to infringe their copyrights in many motion pictures and television 
shows.   It was led in evidence that Sony’s advertisement encouraged users to record their 
favourite shows and build their own libraries.9 The evidence also confirmed that some 
Betamax users had recorded and built libraries of television programmes produced by 
Universal Studios.10 Sony argued that VCRs were “capable of commercially significant non-
infringing uses”, namely time-shifting of TV broadcasts.11  It added that time-shifting was 
one of the fair usages contemplated under the US Copyright Act and more importantly the 
Congress had exempted private use of home recording from copyright violations. It would 
therefore be wrong for Sony to be held for infringements committed by VCR users merely 
because it sold the machine.12  
 
The trial court ruled in favour of Sony but this was reversed by the Ninth Circuit.13 That court 
rejected Sony’s argument and held that time shifting of televised movies infringed 
Universal’s copyright.14 The court also held that the main aim of Betamax was to facilitate 
copyright infringement and Sony was aware of various acts of copyright violations being 
carried out by its customers.15  
 
Dismissing the claims of the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court in its ruling acknowledged the 
necessity of balancing between the rights of copyright holders and the needs of society in 
encouraging technology. Justice Stevens explained that one of the duties of the Congress is to 
formulate a “difficult balance between the interest of authors and inventors in the control and 
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing 
interest in the free flow of information and commerce on the other hand.”16  
 
On liability for contributory infringement, the Supreme Court agreed that it may be 
manifestly just in some instances to impose secondary liability but constructive knowledge of 
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15 Ibid at 975 - 976 
16 Supreme Court at 429 
infringing activity should not be imputed from a general awareness that a machine could be 
used for infringement.17 The Supreme Court imported the “staple article of commerce” 
doctrine from patent law where a technology innovator would be contributory liable if his 
invention has been “especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of a 
patent.”18  It would therefore be wrong to allow copyright owners to control the development 
of new technologies used in connection with copyrighted works.  According to the court “the 
sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce does not constitute 
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial non-infringing uses.”19  
 
The decision in Sony established the fact that dual use technology owners would not be liable 
if they could prove that their technology is capable of substantial non-infringing uses even 
they have constructive notice of infringing usages.  This decision paved ways for future 
development of other technologies that facilitate private and personal use copying.20 However 
some bleak areas about the decision remained. It is not clear from the court’s decision the 
importance it attaches or that should be attached to the word “substantial” when determining 
the quantum of infringement. Some authors concluded that the court erred by not putting its 
conclusion “capable of substantial non-infringement uses into context.21 They explained that 
benefits derived from legitimate use should have been compared with harm occurring from 
illegitimate use. It appears that no matter the extent of copying, the owner of the technology 
would not be liable if it is private and there is no intention of any commercial benefit.  The 
copyright holder must discharge the burden that such act of copying is harmful or that the 
widespread would have the market potential of the copyrighted work.  
 
 
 
3.2 Liability of Peer-to-Peer Software Providers  
 
It would seem obvious that the Sony decision has provided a safe harbour for makers of dual-
use technologies.  In 2000, A&M Records claimed that Napster through its P2P technology 
allowed its users to: (1) make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives 
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18 35 U.S.C §271(c)(2000) 
19 Note 8 at 442 (emphasis supplied) 
20Pamela Samuelsson The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice 
Stevens Fordham Law Review  2006 Vol 74 101 - 145 
21 William Landes & Douglas Litchman, “Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic 
Perspective,” 16 Harvard. J.L. & Tech (2003) 395  
available for copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other 
users’ computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other users’ MP3 files from 
one computer to another via the internet.22  Napster argued that activities of its users fell 
within the exception of fair use. The court held that the wholesale reproduction and 
distribution of copyrighted works by Napster users constituted direct infringement.23  
 
On allegation of contributory infringement, relying on the decision in Sony Corp v Universal 
City Studio,24 Napster argued that its facilities were capable of substantial non-infringing 
activities and it had no actual knowledge that its software was being used for infringing 
activities and if it had any notice it was a constructive one. The court agreed with the 
defendant on this point of law and explained that action premised on contributory liability 
would fail if it could not be proved that a manufacturer did more than ‘merely supplying the 
means to accomplish an infringing an activity’ and that the software was capable of 
commercially significant non-infringing activity. The court inferred actual and specific 
knowledge of direct infringements from the 12,000 copyright notices of infringing files 
supplied by RIAA and a document authored by a co-author of Napster on the “need to remain 
ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses…”25  
 
Turning to the issue of vicarious liability, the defendant was also found liable for having a 
financial interest in the infringing activities and for failing to exercise its supervisory power 
in curtailing the activities. The District Court judge agreed that Napster software was capable 
of non infringing uses but held that the main aim of the software was to facilitate 
unauthorised copying and distribution of copyrighted songs.26  
 
On appeal by the defendant, the Ninth Circuit dismissing the appeal expounded further that in 
the context of the copyright law, vicarious liability extends beyond an employer/employee 
relationship to cases in which a defendant “has the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”27 The higher 
court agreed with the argument that the financial interest of Napster lied in the increases in 
the number of its base users and in fact more users did register as the quantity and quality of 
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24 464 US 417 (1984) 
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music increased.28  The court varied the imposition of vicarious liability on the defendant on 
the ground that the district court failed to recognize that the boundaries of the premises that 
Napster “controls and patrols” are limited. ” In other words Napster’s reserved “right and 
ability” to police is cabined by the system’s current architecture because the Napster system 
does not “read” the content of indexed files, other than to check that they are in the proper 
MP3 format.29 
 
The Ninth Circuit gives Sony a narrow interpretation. It is doubtful if Sony’s makers would 
have escaped liability as carved by the Ninth Circuit here because according to the court what 
the Supreme Court was guarding against was the imputation of constructive knowledge of 
another’s party’s infringement if the defendant was the maker of copying equipment capable 
of substantial non-infringing use. The opinion of Judge Bezzer suggests that more weight is 
placed on the sufficient notice. Though the court does not provide further explanation on the 
meaning of capable of substantial non-infringing activities, his analogy to computer network 
suggests that if the technology is capable of dual usages one of which is good the maker 
would not be liable except he engages in extra act which facilitates the infringement.  
 
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation30, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the 
defendants for vicarious and contributory infringements.31 The plaintiff alleged that the 
Aimster system proprietary software that can be downloaded free of charge from Aimster's 
Web site had been used in facilitating swapping of digital copies of music though Aimster did 
not make copies of the swapped files itself. It also provided computerized tutorials instructing 
users of the software on how to use it for swapping computer files; and formed "Club 
Aimster," a related Internet service that users of Aimster's software could join for a fee and 
use to download the "top 40" popular-music files more easily.   
 
The court held that the principle in Sony would not be applicable where the product was 
specifically manufactured for infringing activity even if the product was capable on non-
infringing uses. Whether a technology is capable of substantial non-infringing uses or not 
would be irrelevant to the innovator’s secondary copyright liability if the product’s actual use 
was infringing.  
                                                 
28 District Court’s decision 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 
29 Ibid 
30 334 F 3d 643 (7th Circuit, 2003) 
31 252 F.Supp.2d 634 
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction solely on the contributory 
infringement claim and substantially narrower grounds. The court concluded that in applying 
the Sony’s doctrine to the provider of an ongoing service, the provider’s ability to supervise 
and prevent its customers from infringing is a vital condition to be considered in determining 
whether the provider is a contributory infringer. This ability to prevent should not form a sole 
factor in determining liability as this would have adverse consequences for the provision of 
dual services. The court explained that “if a service facilitates both infringing and non-
infringing uses...and the detection and prevention of the infringing uses would highly be 
burdensome, the rule could result in the shutting down of the service or its annexation by the 
copyright owners…”32  
 
With respect to knowledge, the appeal court rejected the argument of the defendant founded 
on Sony’s case33 that “mere constructive knowledge of infringing uses is not enough for 
contributory infringement”34 and that Aimster network traffic was encrypted and was thereby 
incapable of knowing exactly what files were being shared by individual end users.35 In the 
lead judgement, Posner C.J. relied on Casella v. Morris,36 and held that “[w]ilful blindness is 
knowledge, in copyright law.”37 
 
Returning to the defendant’s reliance on Sony, the higher court found that the defendant 
failed to demonstrate either in its pleadings or evidence that its software had been used for 
anything other than infringing activity. It however went to suggest that the application of the 
Sony case requires a consideration of the proportion of the infringing to non-infringing uses.38 
 
This writer thinks that this decision conflicts with the Supreme Court’s opinion as stated in 
Sony. The Seventh Circuit’s decision underscores the continuing controversy whether the 
proportion of infringing and non-infringing uses is relevant to Sony. Though the Aimster’s 
decision is more in tandem with the Sony’s protection for providers of dual-use technology 
when compared with the decision by the Ninth Circuit in Napster, this interpretation creates a 
                                                 
32 ibid at 649-650 
33464 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 774   
34 ibid at 439, 
35 ibid 651 
36 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir.1987) 
37 ibid 
38 Aimster ibid 
serious hurdle for innovation.39 A provider of dual-use technology must take into cognisance 
whether non-infringing use of his technology will not only be substantial but whether it will 
be the primary use and whether either use could be substantiated in the court.40   
 
 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster41 is important because (i) it was decided by the 
US Supreme Court; (ii) it acknowledged the Sony Safe harbour for technology providers; (iii) 
it introduced a copyright inducement liability and very importantly and; (iv)unlike other cases 
discussed above, the software was decentralised in nature.  
 
A consortium of entertainment companies led by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc (MGM) 
brought an action for copyright infringement on the ground of contributory infringement 
against Grokster Ltd and StreamCast Networks, Inc.42  According to the plaintiffs, the 
defendants knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable users to infringe 
copyrighted works in violation of the Copyright Act. The defendants did not contest direct 
copyright infringement by end users but counterclaimed that all they did was to connect all of 
the users of software into a network. Convinced by the arguments of the defendants, the trial 
court found them not liable for either contributory or vicarious copyright infringement. 
 
The court, dismissing the appeal enumerated the principles contributory copyright 
infringement claim viz. (i) direct infringement by a third party (ii) knowledge of the 
infringement by the defendant (iii) material contribution to the infringement.43 The first 
principle was not disputed by the parties. On the issues of knowledge, the court concluded 
that what the plaintiff must show is that the defendant had the actual and specific knowledge 
of the infringement; a constructive knowledge or mere awareness that end-users might use 
the technology to carry out infringement would not be enough especially in circumstances 
where it was also capable of non-infringing uses.44 The plaintiff failed to establish this. 
Again, it was not proved that defendant could control the index files available for sharing; the 
network would operate even if the distributors withdrew from the network.45 The Court of 
                                                 
39 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese  (2004) “Stopping Digital Copyright Infringement Without Stopping 
Innovation” Stanford Law Review  56 
40 ibid 
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42 380 F 3D 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) 
43 17 U.S.C.A 501- 513 
44 Supra note 192 at p 1160 
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Appeal also found the defendant did not materially contribute to the infringement. It provided 
neither site (unlike Napster or Aimster) nor facilities for the infringement all it did was to 
make “a software” available.  
 
Direct financial benefits to the defendant, the right and ability to control or supervise, and 
direct infringements are proofs to establish vicarious copyright infringement.46 The court said 
that unlike Napster which has a central file server and could control access to it, neither 
Grokster nor StreamCast could search for infringing files or block the access to users. The 
defendants did not operate as a super-node, and the whole process of locating and connecting 
to a super-node occurred independently of them. It is erroneous to assume that the defendants 
have the ability to supervise or control the users. With this ruling we need to ask whether 
there could be liability for authorisation of copyright infringement as regards “decentralised” 
P2P network generally if a defendant proves that he cannot prevent infringement. 
 
The Supreme Court, rather than addressing the issues of contributory and vicarious liability 
which were at the heart of the lower courts’ decisions, propounded a new theory of copyright 
inducement of liability: 
“[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, going beyond mere distribution with  knowledge of third part action, is 
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device regardless 
of device’s lawful uses.”47 
 
To determine the infringer’s unlawful objective, it must be ascertained whether the alleged 
infringer: (a) showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand of copyright 
infringement; (b) attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the 
infringing activity using the software or technology in question; (c) makes money by selling 
advertising space, by directing ads to the screens of computers employing their software.48 
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The apex court found that the defendants showed intent to foster infringing uses by targeting 
markets comprising former Napster users and the defendant failed to make any attempt to 
control end users’ activities but engaged in active selling of spaces.49  
 
On the issue of actual or constructive knowledge, Souter J clarified that the doctrine in Sony 
would not immunise someone who is seen to actively induce copyright infringement. 
According to him “Sony did not displace other theories of secondary liability and Sony’s rule 
limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a 
distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires court to ignore evidence of intent if there is 
such evidence, and that the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability 
derived from common law.”50 The Supreme Court unanimously overruled the judgement of 
the lowers courts and remanded back to the District Court for disposition. 
 
Is this the decision actually sought by the plaintiffs? Samuelson argued the actual winners are 
Grokster and other peer to peer developers because the court refuses to reverse or eliminate 
the safe harbour for technologies capable of substantial infringement non-infringing uses 
which was the actual aim of MGM.51 She concluded that ‘the copyright industry legal toolkit 
to challenge developers of p2p file-sharing technologies is only marginally greater than 
before the Supreme Court decided the case.’52 Therefore the decision of the Supreme Court 
did not actually translate into victory for digital copyright owners because it has actually 
deprived them what might be the strongest arguments in shutting p2p and other disruptive 
technology developers out of business. 
 
 
4.0 FILE SHARING AND AUTHORISATION OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
IN AUSTRALIA 
 
For a party to be liable of authorising an infringement of copyright there must have first 
occurred, “an act of infringement of the kind purportedly authorised.”53 Ricketson explained 
that unless a person who performed an infringing act did it as an agent of the defendant, the 
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March 2014  
52 ibid at p 1 
53 Lahore J and Rothnie WA, Copyright and Designs ( Butterworth Lexis-Nexis online) at [34,095] 
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defendant would not be liable.54 Section 36(1A) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 lists 
three factors upon which the liability of authorisation of infringement may be premised. The 
court must ask: (i) does the defendant have any power to control the infringement concerned; 
(ii) what is the nature of the relationship existing between the defendant and the direct 
infringer and (iii) has the defendant taken any reasonable steps to avoid the doing of the act, 
including whether the person complied with any relevant industry codes of practice?55  
 
The case of Moorhouse v University of New South Wales56 presents Australian courts position 
on balancing conflicting right of fair use and copyright ownership with dual use technologies. 
The plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant authorised massive infringement of copyrighted 
materials in which he has ownership outside the exemption of fair dealing for purposes of 
private study fair dealing and criticism. On 28 September 1973, Paul Brennan purposely 
copied some chapters from two books to gain evidence for the proceedings against University 
of NSW. The High Court asked the following questions (i) did Paul Brennan infringe the 
copyright of Mr. Moorhouse when he made those copies and (ii) if so, did the University 
authorise the act done by Mr. Brennan that infringed the respondents’ copyright, namely, the 
making of the photocopies?  
 
On the issues of authorisation, the court found the university liable on constructive 
knowledge of the act of infringement because if the University claimed that it did not know 
of infringements, there was ample evidence that it might have suspected it. Also, the 
University had failed to attach notices to the photocopy machines in a form prepared at the 
request of the Australian Vice-Chancellor’s Committee. Placing of photocopier machines in 
the library without appropriate guidelines of terms of usage and adequate supervision is 
synonymous to invitation to copy. The notices placed in pursuance to s.49 of the Copyright 
Act by the university was applicable to photocopies made by and on behalf of the librarian 
and not to photocopies made by individuals for their own use. Absence of qualifying 
invitation might warrant indiscriminate copying by library users.57  
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55 ACA section 101(1A) 
56 [1976] RPC 157  
57 Margaret Jackson and Marita Shelly, “Black hats and white hats: Authorisation and Copyright Infringement in 
Australia and the United States” I.J.L. & I.T. (2006) 14(1), 28-46 
This decision may be of limited application to liability of peer-to-peer file sharing technology 
providers. Much focus was on the compliance of the university with set of rules inviting users 
to make use of the machine. The caution which the American court emphasised on the dual-
use technologies is absent. If the case applied to peer-to-peer file sharing the standard of 
supervision which the court places on providers might be too onerous. In a ‘small’ setting of 
the university, it is doubtful the level of supervision which a school can provide in monitoring 
materials being photocopied. The insufficiency of notices found by court is another strain. 
Factually, will hosting of billboards in a university library prevent illegal photocopying? The 
narrow approach in Moorhouse has largely influenced the peer-to-peer cases in the case 
below. What clearly follows is that activities which countenanced infringement either by 
omission or commission as in the American jurisdiction will be deemed as authorisation. This 
decision therefore shifts the balance in copyright too far in favour of the owner’s rights and to 
the detriment of the proper use of copyrighted works for the good of the society as a whole.          
 
 
 
 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd58 
 
Universal Studios and 30 copyrighted music owners sued Sharman Networks; the 
manufacturer of the software, KaZaA,59  for authorising illegal downloads of its copyrighted 
songs in contrary to the Australian Copyright Act.   
 
The applicants claimed that the respondent, by offering for download to members of the 
public in Australia and by developing and maintaining technical distribution systems 
authorised the copying of whole or substantial parts of their copyrighted digital musical 
recordings without licence. The respondent contended that users of Kazaa and Altnet used a 
graphical user interface (GUI) which allowed them access to peer-to-peer network known as 
FastTrack. And FastTrack is content neutral software. There was no power or ability to 
control the files that users made available to each other or the content which they searched for 
or the content from which they made choices of downloads.  Thus they did not authorise the 
alleged infringement acts but only conferred on users of the software the ability to make 
                                                 
58 [2005] FCA 1242 
59 KaZaA is an internet peer-to-peer file sharing system which allowed users to exchange materials with one 
another irrespective of their location or distance to one another and whether or not the materials being 
exchanged are copyrighted. 
available for download by other users any file in digital format.60 In its decision, the court 
found no liability on the claims but consider whether Sharman and its cohort were actually 
responsible for the authorisation of infringement committed by users of their software.   
 
Section 112E provides that a person who provides facilities for making or facilitating the 
making of a communication is not taken to have authorized any infringement of copyright in 
an audio-visual item merely because another person uses the facilities to infringe copyright. 
The court was of the opinion that the exemption created by section 112E would not be 
available to a person where for reasons other than mere provision of facilities, he or she may 
have authorised the infringement in question.  Wilcox J examined the non-exhaustive factors 
laid down in section 101(1A) and tried to strike a balance between the rulings of the court in 
Adelaide Corporation v Australasian Performing Right Association Limited61and  Moorhouse 
v University of New South Wales.62 It had been held in the latter case that authorisation can be 
made good only where it is established that the person has sanctioned, approved or 
countenanced the infringement. He thus concluded that authorisation here should not be 
narrowly construed as “express or formal permission or sanction”63 rather it entails 
“inactivity or indifference exhibited by commission or omission.”64  
 
In holding Sharman Networks Ltd liable of authorisation of infringing activities of end users, 
the found that the respondent had gone beyond “something more” mere provision of 
facilities. There were series of positive conducts confirming authorisation (i) active 
promotion of its website as a file sharing facility and (ii) popularisation of unlawful file 
sharing by promoting the “Join the Revolution” movement. Furthermore, the respondents 
failed to install any sort of filtering devices despite their awareness of massive infringing 
acts.  
 
 
 
                                                 
60 The respondents like the defendants in Grokster highlighted the positive uses to which the software could be 
put. There is a revolution underway which is changing the world of entertainment. It will effect how you 
discover, buy and share songs, movies, games and ideas. Peer-to-peer technology is driving the revolution and 
it could make life better for everyone. Lower prices, unlimited catalogs and more.” See Universal  Music para 
81’  
61 [1928] HCA 10; (1928) 40 CLR 481 
62 [1976] R.P.C. 151 
63 Universal Music ibid para 367 
64 ibid 
 
5.0 GROKSTER AND SHARMAN COMPARED 
 
5.1. Imposition of Liability 
Decisions given by the US Supreme Court in Grokster’s case and the Australian Federal 
Court in KaZaA agree that actions taken by the vendors of peer-to-peer file-sharing software 
might justify the imposition of secondary copyright liability for copyright infringement. 
Though the facts are seemingly similar, they decisions are based on different factual merit 
and a different standard of liability. A direct infringement by the end-users is a common 
ground which all the cases recognise as a condition precedent for imposition of secondary 
liability. Before arriving at the liability of the producers, the cases conclude that there must 
be a primary infringement which is traceable to the software produced by the manufacturer. 
Mere production is not enough but there must be inducement or “something more.” 
 
In Grokster, the U.S Supreme Court formulated a new theory of copyright inducement 
liability against third parties who produce and distribute devices capable of both infringing 
and non-infringing uses. This new theory is meant to complement the doctrines of 
contributory copyright liability and vicarious copyright liability. What this decision however 
suggests is that tangible evidence of actions motivating the use of the software for copyright 
infringement must be adduced.  
 
Though the Australian court directed its mind to other inducements actions, this only formed 
one of the several elements the court considered in arriving at its decision. The court has been 
largely influenced by section 101 and 101(A) of the Australian Copyright Act. Section 101 
imposes secondary liability on any person who, not being the owner of the copyright and 
without the licence of the copyright owner, authorises another person to do in Australia an 
infringing act.65 Section 101(1A) provides further that regards must be had to “(a) the extent 
(if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the act concerned; (b) the nature of any 
relationship existing between the person and the person who did the act concerned; (c)          
whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the act, 
including whether the person complied with any relevant industry codes of practice.”66 Also 
the court did not accept that section 112E on safe harbour as immunising against a liability 
                                                 
65 ACA 1968 s101(1) 
66 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 Amendments from Act No. 63 of 2002 
for authorisation. Section 112 has excluded from liability a provider whose facilities have 
been used to violate copyright.  
 
It is submitted that the decision in Australian’s KaZaA is narrow compared to US Grokster. 
The Australian decision imposes a duty of care to adopt standards and provide mechanisms 
for the prevention of copyright infringement on manufacturers and distributors of peer-to-
peer file sharing software. This negligence-type rule holds providers of software liable for 
any failure to design any economically reasonable measures to prevent the harm of 
infringements.67  Though the US Supreme Court settled for the theory of inducement, it does 
not mean the common law doctrine of secondary liability could not be shaped into 
negligence-type rule as did by the Australian federal court.68 Apparently, the US court 
contemplated the side effects of secondary liability and such other factors like the fear that 
copyright owners might gain control over new and the budding technologies and the resultant 
effect of imposition of liability on manufacturers and distributors might have on non-
infringing activities that rely on and use the same devices.69 
 
By and large, Grokster protects distributors and manufacturers of peer-to-peer file-sharing 
software from secondary liability unless copyright owners discharge the burden of proof of 
inducement of copyright infringements engaged in.  In KaZaA on the other hand, the duty of 
care standard has far reaching implications for providers of software. Is the KaZaA decision 
not over stretching the “neighbour test” and “reasonably foreseeable test” negligence doctrine 
of common law?  What does this suggest to internet service providers who have no 
capabilities of taking reasonable step to prevent or control copyright infringements of peer-to-
peer file sharing activity? A common conclusion of the court approach both the negligence 
rule and imposition of secondary liability save enforcement costs of suing a large number of 
end users who are engaging in primary infringement activity.70 
 
Grokster did not discuss how contributory infringement and inducement of infringement 
liabilities might extend to joint venture parties. On the other hand the court in the KaZaA case 
adopted a wide approach and found liable other respondents who had real control or influence 
                                                 
67 Guy Pessach, “An International Comparative Perspective on Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Third Part 
Liability in Copyright Law: Framing the Past, Present, and Next Generations’ Question” Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law Vol. 40 (2007) 1 at 7  
68 Supra note 21 at 405 
69 See Breyer J concurring opinion in MGM Studios Inc v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct 2764, 2792-96 (2004) 
70 Guy Pessach Note 67 at 8 
over policy making in the development and operation of the KaZaA system. These fringe 
players (controlling corporate shareholders and dominant sole directors) were liable 
individually and joint tortfeasors pursuant to a common design71 of having the knowledge of 
end users infringing activities because despite their powers they failed to implement 
preventive measures or control the acts.  This liability will exclude employees without any 
real say or influence in companies’ policy making. 
 
5.2 Knowledge 
Generally, knowledge is a condition precedent for proof of liability under contributory 
infringement doctrine and inducement of infringement doctrine in the US. It was held in 
some cases that actual knowledge of specific infringement is required where the product is 
capable of substantial non-infringement and constructive knowledge suffices where the 
product is not capable of such uses. Elsewhere, proof of constructive knowledge by the 
defendant discharges the burden. It is unfortunate that US Supreme Court failed to stipulate 
the required form of knowledge. This has led to further contradictory interpretations by the 
lower courts. In the re-hearing of the Grokster case,  Wilson J  was of the opinion that what 
the Supreme Court suggested was that liability may attach if all the defendant had is 
constructive knowledge of the infringement.72 However in Monotype Imaging, Inc et al v 
Bitstream Inc,73 the court was of the opinion that Grokster precluded constructive knowledge. 
 
The Australian court places less emphasis on the type of knowledge required. The court is of 
the view that there may be authorisation without knowledge and yet mere knowledge will not 
be enough.74 It follows that knowledge forms one of the factors which Australian court will 
put into consideration and its absence would not be detrimental to proof of authorisation due 
to the negligence-type rule and the provision of section 101(1A) of the Australian Copyright 
Act as amended by the Digital Agenda Act 2000.  
 
5.3 Safe Harbour 
The importance of safe harbour is to exclude genuine providers and users from liabilities. Its 
purpose is to strike a balance between innovation and competition on one hand and copyright 
                                                 
71 Sharman 2005 at para 489;  
72 Actual transcript cited in Jeffrey C.J. Lee, “The ongoing Design Duty in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v 
Sharman License Holdings Ltd: Casting the Scope of Copyright Infringement Even Wider” Int J.L. & I.T (2007) 
275 at 292 
73 Civ. No. 03 C4349 (N.D. 111, July 12, 2005) 
74 Sharman para 370 
owners’ interest on the other hand.  The court in Sony stipulates what constitutes a defence to 
contributory infringement and section 112E prescribes a safe harbour under the Australian 
Copyright Act. Sony has excluded from contributory liability producers of product capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses. According to the court no liability would lie on presumption 
of intent to cause infringement solely from design or contribution of a product capable of 
lawful use. The US Supreme Court complicated issues by failing to address or expatiate on 
some elements which were not resolved in Aimster and the Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Grokster. For example the Supreme could have defined ‘capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses’ the point at which contribution could said to have occurred when we say substantial, is 
it on quality or quantity?  
 
Unlike the court in Grokster, the Australian court’s approach though wide seems clearer. The 
court puts manufacturer and providers under a strict liability similar to the old English 
authority in Ryland v. Fletcher.75 According to Wilcox J section 112E does not confer 
general immunity against a finding of authorisation’ when for other reasons, the alleged 
infringer may have taken to have authorised the primary infringement. Two things come to 
mind when considering the court’s interpretation of s112E. First, the court must have adopted 
the “mischief rule of interpretation” to make sure that Digital Amendment Act responds to the 
purpose of its enactment; to combat technological threat to IPR regime. Second, a defendant 
must really prove that he fits within the exception to invoke the safe harbour provision.  
Therefore a defendant must establish that there is no authorisation in any form. On the 
contrary, the defendant had an actual knowledge that the predominant use of the software was 
for sharing of copyright material.76 
 
Casting the scope of secondary infringement wider, the Australian court failed to really 
define what would the safe harbour be. It failed to outline circumstances under which 
circumstances under which technology distributor may seek fortress of section 112E when 
confronted with liability from misuse of their of their products. Has the Australian court not 
rendered the section 112E safe harbour provision useless? Will such an approach not stifle 
technological development and innovation when the essence of copyright is to develop 
science and arts? There is little contention that the Australian approach is strictly pro-
copyright protection. 
                                                 
75 (1868) LR 3 HL 330 
76 para 186 
 
 
6.0 PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING IN CANADA – PURSUING THE 
INDIVIDUALS  
 
The approach to liability of distributors of p2p software in Canada is pretty vague and most 
complex of all jurisdictions examined in this paper.77  Canada is described as “a haven where 
technologically sophisticated international piracy organizations can operate with virtual 
impunity”78 because it lacks controversial legislation like the American DCMA which 
expressly prohibits the breaking or the distribution of tools for breaking technology 
preventing piracy.   
 
In the US and Australia, primary infringement by end-users set the ground for the secondary 
liability of the up-loaders and distributors of software. The Canadian copyright law allows 
making of a copy for personal use but fails to address the source of that copy. In the absence 
of specific legislation, the legality or otherwise of uploading will be in favour of end-users. 
 
Section 80(1) of the Canadian Copyright Act excludes users from liability for downloading of 
musical works and sound recordings for private use purposes. If an end-user however copies 
a copyrighted work with the aim of selling or renting, distributing, communicating to the 
public by telecommunication or performing in the public according to s.80 (2) it shall no 
longer be deemed as private copying.  The Private Copying Decision,79 by the Canadian 
Copyright Board confirmed that private copying onto audio recording media by end-users is 
permissible but the liability of those uploading or providing software or operating networks 
or internet connection is not in issue.80  It does not matter whether the source of the track is a 
borrowed CD or downloaded from the internet.81 The Canadian Recording Industry 
Association (CRIA) alleged that some users infringed its copyright by illegally trading in 
music downloaded from the internet by means of KaZaA software.  The Canadian Federal 
Court was invited in BMG Canada Inc v John Doe82 to compel five Canadian ISPs to disclose 
the identity of these end-users.  The court declared that “copyright law can be invoked by 
                                                 
77 International Intellectual Property Alliance Canada 2011Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and 
Enforcement available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2011/2011SPEC301CANADA.pdf  accessed 23 March 2014  
78 ibid 
79 Private Copying 2003-2004 (Copying for Private Use (2003) available at http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf   accessed on 27 March 2014  
80 ibid at p 19 
81 ibid at p 20 
82 See also BMG Canada Inc v John Doe [2004] FC 488 
owners only to the extent explicitly set forth in the statute. A court cannot infer or provide 
right that are not provided for in the statute.”83  Placing of a copy on a shared directory in a 
computer where that copy can be accessed via a P2P service does not amount to distribution.  
 
On what might contribute authorisation, the court alluded to the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
decision in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada84  where it was held that “a 
person does not authorise infringement by authorising the mere use of equipment that could 
be used to infringe copyright.” The court was of the view that rule of authorisation must be 
limited in scope particularly attention must be paid to the relationship or degree of control 
which exist between alleged authoriser and the person who committed the copyright 
infringement. On the legality or otherwise of P2P, it was held that such a decision should be 
left for the future. This over-cautious approach perpetuates the legal vacuum and ambiguity 
surrounding the Canadian approach to P2P music file sharing. 
 
The CCH decision suggests that authorisation in Canada would also require active 
participation by inducer as found in earlier examined cases; and the control which the 
distributor could exercise on users and their activities. It is also clear that a user for private 
purpose must not distribute but the way P2P works does not require any action from a user 
before a recipient could have access to his shared directory. Can liability be imposed on a 
private user for not blocking access to his shared directory? That is, liability based on 
omission to act.  
 
Cases such as Voltages Pictures LLC v. Jane Doe85 and NGN Prima Productions Inc v Does86 
suggest that copyright holders prefer to pursue human distributors instead of technology 
developers. So the Canadian court has not properly had the opportunity to examine the nature 
of P2P technology. The Demonoid’s owner shut down its system and later prevented access 
of downloaders with Canadian IP address.87There seems little doubt that this case may afford 
                                                 
83 ibid at 23 
84 [2004] SCR 339 at 38 
85 [2011] F.C.J. No. 1260 available at https://cippic.ca/uploads/Voltage_v._Does-2014FC161.pdf  accessed on 
20 March 2014  
86 Federal Court, Montreal Quebec November 19, 2012 available at http://copyrightenforcement.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/NGN-Order-Montreal.pdf  accessed on 20 March 2014  
87 Nick Farrell “Demonoid p2p site returns from dead” 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1002844/demoniod-p2p-site-returns-dead accessed on 20 March 2014  
 
the court the opportunity create or follow the concept of capable of substantial non infringing 
uses.   
 
7.0 CONCLUSION 
This essay has retraced the interaction of P2P networks with copyright law. It establishes that 
a complex and interdependent relationship between copyright law and technology still exists. 
Copyright law provides an incentive for author to create new works and also gives the society 
the opportunity to have access to the information it needs. Peer-to-peer software 
revolutionises access and consumption of entertainment by snatching control of distribution 
away from the authors and creators. With the help of the court, copyright law is however 
expanding in determining the fate of technologies which are a tool which facilitates the 
dissemination of this information. Such expansion has been not a blanket or unbridled one as 
they are strictly regulated by the courts. The courts in the jurisdictions considered have used 
various factors among which are: the dual nature or the significance of non-infringing uses, 
absence or lack of intent in promoting infringement, the level of control on the use of 
technology, knowledge of infringement and the financial benefits to determine the extent of 
liability of technology owners. Comparing these decisions, it is obvious that finding search 
for middle grounds continue to remain blurry.  The approaches in the US and Australia share 
some similarities while Canada offers something which is at the far end of the spectrum.   
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